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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID ON ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
Lessons from the Korean economic miracle 
 
By 
 
MEBRAHTU, Kiros Tikue 
 
 
One of the gaps in development economics has been its inability to see 
the possible impact of foreign aid clearly. All economists who 
participated in the area came out with variety of results. In this regard 
the case of the Korean rapid economic development could be 
considered as one of the unconcluded issues.   
 
According to several politicians and researchers, the Korean economic 
development resulted from the huge flow of foreign aid. Despite, the 
internal quality of the nation in its take-off, many researchers and 
politicians had been observed when they conclude the reverse.     
 
The main them of this manuscript fall on assessing the role of foreign 
aid on development with especial consideration to the Korean case. In 
this material the basic questions like  ‘what is the role of foreign 
economic aid in Korea’s early development (take-off)?’ And ‘Why the 
Korean Economy grew fast after the early 1960s? Was Korea got more 
foreign aid after 1961 than before?’ are assessed in depth.    
                                                                                                                                 
  
 
In order to consolidate the discussion the flow of foreign aid before 
and after 1961 are shown in detail. Based on the nature of the data 
simple techniques like graphs and tables are used. In addition, some 
basic economic indicators like GNP, national savings, trade balance 
and imports by type of expenditure are assessed. 
 
The evidences in the material showed that the role of foreign aid is 
found to be insignificant in the economic take-off and economic 
development in South Korea. The volume of foreign aid and the 
economic performance in the nation showed to be opposite. Thus, 
foreign aid in Korea was very high in the 1950s, which had been 
characterized with economic stagnation. In contrast, the Korean 
economy grew with in very short time when the foreign aid declined 
and stopped in the early take-off.     
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
1.1    A Brief Statement of the Problem  
It is much more clear that Korea was one of the poor countries, 
which marked with weak economic performance in 1950s. It was 
the main foreign aid receiving country in the world. Imported goods 
to the nation were financed through grant from foreign countries 
and agencies for the whole decade. The major economic indicators 
for the period showed that the living standard of the Korean citizens 
in the period was 32 times lower than of their grand sons.  
 
Surprisingly, Korea became one of the newly industrialized nations 
with in less than one generation. Recent reports on science and 
innovation proved that the nation is among the top Knowledge 
based economies. According to the OECD Science, Technology and 
Industry Scoreboard, Korea is the second country in high and 
medium-high-technology manufacturing. 1  Thus, its economic 
progress is among the impressive economic changes in the century.  
 
                                                 
1 OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 2001 
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The rapid change from very low economic performance to high 
economic strength and prosperity in Korea provokes to raise very 
important questions in the area of economic development. Why 
South Korea grew fast and other similar countries are not? What 
are the main factors for the Korean success in the early 1960s 
(take-off)?  Such basic questions are in the mind of researchers and 
politicians in the world. This is the reason why several researchers 
devoted their time to dugout the secret of the economic success in 
South Korea.  
 
In answering such basic questions all people took different stands 
on the factors of economic miracle in South Korea. Many of the 
researchers and politicians in less developed countries stressed that 
the Korean success is directly related to foreign aid.  
 
As the effect of the above conclusion, the leaders and politicians in 
less developed countries dragged their feet to learn about the 
Korean economic development experience. In stead, they linked the 
success to the flow of foreign aid and concluded that Korean 
economic miracle is exceptional phenomenon in the world, which 
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happened because of the special interest of the United States in the 
region and its support for the nation. 
 
This paper is devoted on the line with the contribution to prove the 
role of foreign aid in economic development. The corner stone of 
this paper falls on the argument that foreign aid has no significant 
role on fast economic development. The sole example on this 
regard is the case of South Korea. In contrast to the conclusions 
from politicians and scholars in less developed countries the success 
of South Korea goes to the internal strength of Koreans theme 
selves.  
 
To prove the weak effect of foreign aid on the course of building the 
Korean economy, I strongly stressed on answering and assessing 
puzzles like, 1) what is the role of foreign economic aid in Korea’s 
early development (take-off)? 2) Why the Korean Economy grew 
fast after the early 1960s? Was Korea got more foreign aid after 
1961 than before? And 3) comparing the export volume of Korea to 
American market with respect to the Korean miracle.   
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According to the findings in the paper the clear difference between 
foreign aid and the economic progress could be showed in two main 
periods, before 1961 and after 1961. The period before 1961 
observed to be characterized with huge flow of foreign aid and 
economic stagnation. South Korea showed as the main foreign aid 
receiving country in the period.  
 
Thus, we can confidently conclude that South Korea was running 
through foreign fund. Unfortunately, the economic indicators in the 
nation continued to be worst until the early 1960s. Therefore, the 
empirical findings in this material showed that foreign aid had no 
significant impact on the economic performance of South Korea. 
Plenty of evidences are presented on the line with to prove the 
economic stagnation and the pick time of flows of foreign aid for the 
period.  
 
In the same way, the trends of foreign aid and the economic 
progress after 1961 continued to be opposite. Chapter 5 of this 
material shows that foreign aid to Korea in the considered period is 
much lower than in the period before 1961. This flow of foreign aid 
became negligible during the 1960s and totally stopped after the 
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early 1970s. In the opposite direction the economic progress of the 
nation became very impressive and the Korean economy became 
among the fast progressing economies and prosperous in short time. 
Therefore, all evidences for all periods in the material showed that 
foreign aid has almost negligible impact to economic development 
in South Korea. The case of South Korea is also considered as sole 
example to see the impact of foreign aid on economic development 
is more less than right domestic strategy and policies.    
 
In the paper, the perception of leaders and politicians in less 
developed countries is given top priority. Many of them observed 
when they highly relied on foreign aid and   focus on external 
economic factors based on the miss leaded conclusions on the 
Korean miracle. Thus, this material contributes on explaining the 
Korean economic miracle correctly and it may beneficial for these 
who are poor countries and interested to seize the relevant 
experiences.   
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1.2. Map of the Paper 
The paper starts by demonstrating the basic concepts of foreign aid. 
It consists definitions and arguments regarding foreign aid. The 
followed chapter gives special focus on the arguments regarding the 
role of foreign aid in the Korean economic development. The 
arguments in this part are the main motive to develop this material.  
 
The next chapter explains the economic development strategy, the 
economic performance and the export sector by comparing with the 
volume of foreign economic assistance in the period prior to 1961.  
 
In addition, the paper tried to assess the period after 1961 by 
giving glance to the above main issues and the share of Korea’s 
export to the United State in order to see its role in the export and 
economic growth.  
 
In chapter 6, the role of foreign aid on the Korean economic 
development is discussed separately. Then the paper ends up with 
final conclusion and recommendations.  
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1.3 Methodology Used 
The paper depends on the data from Bank of Korea website and 
data in different literatures, which may be used for other purposes. 
The research problem based on the conclusions and findings from 
some books and understanding of leaders and politicians in 
developing countries regarding the Korean economic development 
success.  
 
The main tools used in my analysis are graphs and tables. The 
nature of this paper is more qualitative. In order to elaborate the 
discussion I have used several graphs by dividing the economic 
history of Korea in to two parts, before and after 1961.  
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Chapter 2  
Basic Concepts of Foreign Aid 
2.1. Defining Foreign Aid 
According to different literatures, the term foreign aid takes several 
definitions. Not only in its definition, by name refers to foreign 
assistance or development cooperation even sometimes partnership. 
According to the history, foreign aid as an instrument of national 
policy dates from the 18th century, when Frederick the Great of 
Prussia subsidized certain allies to assure their military support and 
effectiveness. This practice continued intermittently in Europe 
during the 19th century. (Britannica, vol.4 877) 
 
The concept of aid is quite broad in its variety and dimensions. As 
Peter Burnell noted out, aid goes to a states, proto-states and 
would-be states, even countries with whom the provider doesn’t 
have normal diplomatic ties, for instance North Korea’s receipt of 
rice aid from South Korea and Japan.2  
 
In the other side, foreign aid could be used as main tool for some 
strategic or political interests. Even we can’t deny that it some 
                                                 
2 Peter Burnell, Foreign Aid in a changing World, 1997, Open University Press 
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times and by some donor governments used as a means to 
strengthening trade relations with receipt countries. Therefore, 
foreign aid is huge & complex area of economic development. 
Because of its complexity, clear definition of the term is the 
prerequisite for this material. 
 
In common usage of the term foreign aid, it takes the form of 
humanitarian aid, transfer of lethal equipment between 
governments (which includes military assistance or military 
support). On the other hand, the tax incentives and cash grant 
member states offer for a certain country to attract inward 
corporate investment also are often referred to as aid.  
 
Further more, the loan provided by International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and other banks, which much of their financing is at interest 
rates barely more favorable than commercial or near-to-market 
terms is conjunct with aid. Similarly some market arrangements for 
imported goods from a certain country also considered as one form 
of aid.   
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So far so forth, the common usage of the term aid in the above 
explanations doesn’t provide a clear and consistent lead for the 
analysis of the economic impact of foreign aid in developing 
countries. Thus, summarized and clear definition of the term is 
strongly needed for the impact analysis of foreign aid on economic 
growth. 
  
Foreign aid is international transfer of capital goods or services for 
the benefit of other nations and their citizens. Official foreign aid is 
offered in two major forms, capital transfers, in a cash or kind, 
either as grants or loans and technical assistance and training, 
usually as grants in the form of human resources and technical 
equipment. (Britannica, vol.4 877)  
 
In the same way, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
defines oda as resources transferred on concessional financial terms 
with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as the main declared objective. This embraces 
humanitarian assistance and emergency relief, which have a longer 
history than development project aid. 3 
                                                 
3 Peter Burnell, Foreign Aid in a changing World, 1997, Open University Press 
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2.2. The Role of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth 
Intensive studies had been conducted regarding the role of foreign 
aid on the growth of developing economies. The main intuition here 
is to give general highlights on the findings and conclusions with 
respect to the main objective of the material.  
 
Dozen of economists argued that growth of developing economies 
depends to a large extent on their own economic policies. For 
instant, Craig Burnside and David Dollar noted that poor countries 
with sound economic policies benefit directly from the policies, and 
in this environment aid accelerates growth. In highly distorted 
economies, however, aid is dissipated in unproductive government 
expenditure.4   
 
In the same way, they figured out that aid might have more impact 
on growth in the developing world if it were systematically allocated 
toward good policy environments. 
 
On the other hand, many economists argued foreign aid has no 
positive impact on the growth of developing economies. Peter 
                                                 
4  The American Economic Review, Vol. 90, Number 4, 2000. 
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Boone has presented a simple analytical framework where poverty 
is caused or enhanced by distortionary policies introduced by 
politicians. According to him, aid does not promote economic 
development for two reasons: poverty is not caused by capital 
shortage, and it is not optimal for politicians to adjust distortionary 
policies when they receive aid flow.5 
   
Not only Peter Boone other economists share this argument. Peter 
Burnell underlined the role of foreign aid as insignificant at all for 
economic development in less developed countries. According to 
Burnell, aid is neither a necessary condition nor a sufficient 
condition for development or economic growth.  
 
Even the DAC acknowledges that Official Development Assistance 
(oda) is less important than ‘healthy access’ to international 
markets, capital, and technology, and that all of the external factors 
play only a secondary role to the efforts of the people in developing 
countries. Figures consistently bear out a positive correlation 
between economic growth rates in the developing world and 
                                                 
5 National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 5308, 1995 
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integration into world markets for goods, services, capital and 
labor.6  
 
Some of the researchers also noted that the foreign aid impact on 
the economic growth is mixed and contradictory. A more recent 
empirical work on the impact of aid on growth made of use of data 
1960-70, 1970-80, and 1980-83, and added two more variables as 
possible determinants: exports and literacy proved the result is 
mixed.  
 
The study concluded “that aid in the aggregate has no 
demonstrable effect on economic growth in recipient countries in 
either period,” contradicting Papanek’s findings for the 1960s. The 
multiple coefficient of aid on growth is negative (-0.0492) and 
significant at 5 percent in the 1960s, positive but altogether 
insignificant in the 1970s and 1980s.7   
 
The other extreme side advocated that foreign aid plays critical role 
in economic growth of some developing countries. The sole example 
                                                 
6 Peter Burnell, Foreign Aid in a Changing World, 1997, Open University Press. 
7 Romeo A.Reyes, Absorptive Capacity for Foreign Aid, 1993, Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 
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for this side is the case of economic development success in South 
Korea.  
 
According to David C. Cole, the massive inflow of foreign assistance 
before and during the Korean War was essential to the survival of 
South Korea as an independent country. Continuation of a high 
level of economic assistance for the decade after the war probably 
made the difference between the small 1.5 percent per annum 
growth rate and no growth at all in per capita income. With out this 
growth, the living standard of the population would have remained 
desperate, political cohesion would have deteriorated, and the 
foundations for subsequent high growth would have not have been 
forged.8 
 
The above arguments are some of the different conclusions drawn 
by economists and politicians. These arguments indicate that 
foreign aid is huge, complex and fragmented subject. The findings 
on the subject not only they are inconsistent but also contradictory 
each other.  
 
                                                 
8 Cole, D., Korean Economy: Issues of Development, (1980)  (P.26) 
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It was learned that the final conclusion on the developmental role of 
foreign aid is a question with out clear-cut answer negatively or 
positively. I feel this may be concluded by Henry Bruton remark. 
According to him  ‘aid is necessary in a variety of ways, but one of 
the great failures in development economics has been its inability to 
see clearly where aid can help and where it harms and defeats.9   
 
2.3. Summary of the Chapter 
From several researchers, we can understand that foreign aid is 
unsettled aspect of development economics. Nevertheless, 
researches conducted in this area can’t be undervalued in their 
contribution to analyze its impact. They provided us very important 
guide for other researches that can give generalized and 
consistence answer for role of foreign aid in the future.  
 
We have learned that the role of foreign aid in economic growth is 
not defined clearly where it could be useful. Based on previous 
findings, additional effort is needed in the area.  
 
                                                 
9 Henry J.Bruton (1985), P.1120. 
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In any side, we can put the following four different conclusions in 
previous works:  
1. The first side has concluded the role of foreign aid on 
economic growth is almost negligible. Even though, they 
failed to give precise answer if foreign aid affects the 
economic growth negatively or positively, they confirm that 
foreign aid has no any correlation (negatively or positively) 
with economic growth. 
2.  The second group believes that foreign aid can affect the 
economic growth of developing countries if it is allocated in 
good domestic policies. 
3. Foreign aid plays crucial role in economic growth through 
filling the capital shortage in developing countries. 
4. The last and the fourth group say that foreign aid affects 
economic growth negatively by increasing government 
structure and/or expenditure.  
 
Even though the above conclusions are different and may be 
contradicted, all of them have their own credits. This is true 
because of two main reasons: there is considerable difference in 
their data considerations and for sure there is no standardized data 
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classification and clearly handled data in this area. For the purpose 
of this study the above conclusions can be as initial fact. Therefore, 
this study is expected to contribute some evidence on one of the 
above-discussed four different findings in previous studies.  
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Chapter 3  
Major Arguments on Korean Economic Miracle 
 
 
Intensive studies had been conducted regarding the rapid growth of 
the Korean economy and the export sector. My intention here is not 
to explain the detail history of the Korean economic development 
nor the export growth.  
 
The main focus of this paper is on assessing three basic puzzles, 
which are 1) what is the role of foreign economic aid in Korea’s 
early development (take-off), 2) why the Korean Economy grew 
fast after the early 1960s, was Korea got more foreign aid after 
1961 than before. And 3) comparing the export volume of Korea to 
American market with respect to the Korean miracle. 
 
Before my detail discussion on the above puzzles, it is quite 
important to mention the major arguments and believes regarding 
the rapid Korean economic growth. 
 
In fact, many scholars have tried to assess these topics in different 
dimensions. But I strongly believe that every scholar doesn’t 
explain clearly and in balanced way about the internal strength of 
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Koreans in their early development or explained in biased way that 
gives more emphasis to the role of outsiders.   
 
The sentiment of the American scholars and some Koreans who 
assess the Korean economic development is basically the same. 
They tried to bold the role of the U.S. and they stress more on the 
weaknesses of the developmental state at that time.  
 
In the same manner the leaders of today’s low-income developing 
countries lack commitment to seize the important elements of the 
Korean economic development experience.  In stead, they claim to 
get open market for their exports from America as well as massive 
economic aid from foreigners. They believe Korea had succeeded 
because of these factors. Therefore, the correct explanation of the 
economic growth of Korea has very important implication for all 
low-income developing countries. 
 
The main motive for developing this material falls on the arguments 
and controversies on the experience of the Korean miracle. Despite, 
some general statements, most of arguments on the issue are 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
20
 
along the side of appreciating and bolding the foreign aid and other 
external factors in the Korean economic success history.  
 
Most of the extreme arguments in favor of foreign aid for its crucial 
role in Korean economic take-off could be represented by the 
following some arguments.  
 
3.1 Arguments Regarding Foreign Economic Aid to Korea 
 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (the current 
ruling Party in Ethiopia) has designed comprehensive economic plan 
to achieve rapid economic growth in the country. In its economic 
plan, it took in to account the economic development success of 
South Korea and Taiwan.  
 
Unfortunately, many politicians and scholars argued that this plan is 
simply dream and impossible to realize. According to them, South 
Korea or Taiwan’s economic success strongly depended on massive 
foreign aid. Particularly, U.S. interest in the region enabled them to 
collect large sum of aid and the only reason for their success was 
foreign aid.  
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Based on this argument, do you think we have the same 
opportunity like South Korea and Taiwan to get massive aid? If not, 
what will be the way to achieve fast economic development like that 
of the Korean and Taiwan economic miracle?10 
 
The above comment and/or question were directed from journalists 
to Prime Minister Melles of Ethiopia in Amharic (local language) on 
Oct 26/2001.  
 
Indeed, this idea certainly shared by most politicians and scholars 
in developing countries. Whether they have sufficient evidence of 
the matter or not, they tended to conclude South Korea’s economic 
success was the result of massive foreign aid.   
 
In similar way, we can see the other part of this argument from 
some scholars. The book written by David C. Cole, Youngil Lim, and 
Paul W. Kuznets can be my main reference to the whole issues of 
discussions in this regard. The scholars’ main target in their 
discussion was to show us the dominant role of economic assistance 
from U.S. for the Korean economic development. Despite their data, 
                                                 
10 Prime Minister Melles’s interview with local journalists Amharic TV (translated to English), Oct 2001 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
22
 
they tried to magnify the role of foreign economic assistance by 
even trying to include the military imports as one of the economic 
assistance and basic investment. These scholars explained the 
foreign assistance to Korea in the following way. 
 
The availability of national accounting statistics from 1953 on 
makes it possible to assess the role of foreign assistance in a more 
quantitative framework than is possible for the previous years. But 
there is still a problem in arriving at exact figures, because Korean 
statistics have tended to understate the magnitude of foreign aid by 
omitting military assistance, loan-financed economic assistance, 
some portions of the PL 480 agricultural commodities, and Japanese 
grant aid. The United States, on the other hand, publishes 
comprehensive statistics on obligations or payments for U.S. fiscal 
years, but these seldom bear any resemblance to the Korean 
statistics, which are in a calendar year arrivals bases. Thus, it is not 
easy to relate annual aid flows precisely to concurrent national 
accounts magnitudes in Korea.11 
 
                                                 
11 Cole, D., Korean Economy: Issues of Development, (1980)  (P.12) 
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From the above brief explanation in the book written by these 
scholars, we can simply grasp that they tended to conclude the 
Korean economy grew because of the American aid including the 
importation of military equipments. In their explanation they 
mentioned that it is difficult to take inventory of the foreign 
assistance. But they have tried to give emphasis to the critical role 
of foreign economic assistance. Even though, they had no any 
empirical evidence, their final conclusion on the matter is the 
following. 
  
The massive inflow of foreign assistance before and during the 
Korean War was essential to the survival of South Korea as an 
independent country. Continuation of a high level of economic 
assistance for the decade after the war probably made the 
difference between the small 1.5 percent per annum growth rate 
and no growth at all in per capita income. With out this growth, the 
living standard of the population would have remained desperate, 
political cohesion would have deteriorated, and the foundations for 
subsequent high growth would have not have been forged.12 
 
                                                 
12 Cole, D., Korean Economy: Issues of Development, (1980)  (P.26) 
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According to the writers the contribution of foreign assistance to a 
country’s development is generally assessed in two main 
dimensions: (1) as a supplement to domestic savings that makes 
possible a higher rate of capital formation; and (2) as a supplement 
to imports that permits a higher rate of production from existing 
capacity.13 
 
3.2 Arguments Regarding the Korean Export and United 
States Market 
 
Most of the arguments regarding the Korean economic growth 
emphasis on the U.S. market opportunity. These arguments showed 
that trade relationship between these two countries had critical 
impact on the overall Korea’s economic growth. Similarly, leaders of 
less developed countries argued that they could not blamed based 
on the Korean rapid economic development. Because they believe 
Korea grew by special market opportunity from United States.  
 
Not only these people, different scholars also agree on this issue. 
They have given top importance for the U.S. market in the history 
of Korean economic growth. But the Korean exports to U.S. market 
                                                 
13Cole, D., Korean Economy: Issues of Development, (1980)  (P.26) 
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was not very far large when compared to the exports to Japan. And 
when we see the import-export of Korea for several years, we can 
observe that there were several countries, which were trade 
partners to Korea.  
 
In the other part of this paper we will assess the other markets 
including the exports to U.S. But in this topic we can see the 
argument given by David C. Cole in his book, which explains the 
role of U.S. in the Korean economic growth. 
 
Indeed, exports have not only been the leading sector in the Korean 
economy, but they have also stimulated growth in other sectors. It 
is noteworthy that, during the 1960s, the demand for Korean 
merchandise grew even faster in the U.S. than in the rest of the 
world. In  1968, at the peak of this trend, Korean exports to the 
U.S. amounted to 52 percent of her total exports. Thereafter, this 
percentage declined, but it has stabilized for the past five years at 
about one-third of Korean goods, and is likely to remain so for 
decades to come.14  
 
                                                 
14 Cole, D., Korean Economy: Issues of Development, (1980)  (P.31) 
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Cole, D. emphasized on the role of U.S. markets but not other 
markets. This implies that he tended to magnify the role of the U.S. 
market for Korean economic growth. The main concern here is not 
the issue of simple explanation of the Korean export volume to U.S. 
market. But it is beyond the simple explanation and has very 
important meaning to these of still poor countries. 
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Chapter 4  
 Foreign Economic Aid and Economic Growth   
(Independence – 1961) 
 
4.1.  Economic Growth Strategy in the Period  
An independent government was established in August 1948 in 
South alone after 36-years Japanese occupation. According to 
different writers, this time was a separation of the South from the 
North and the separation from the Japanese economy. 
 
Therefore, liberation and independence was not an easy task for 
new South Korea. The new nation remained only with agriculturally 
suitable environment and light industries. The natural resource 
potential and heavy industries remained in the North part. 
Simultaneously, Japan had quieted its major supply of capital goods 
and finished consumer goods to South Korea. 
 
As a result of the evacuation of Japanese considerable gaps were 
created in the areas of technicians and management manpower. In 
other wards, there were bottlenecks in the Korean economy, which 
challenged the nation as a new and small country. 
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On the other hand, the government was faced with vast problems, 
mainly, higher rate of unemployment, hyper-inflation, trade balance 
deficits, food shortages including day-to-day necessities such as 
medicine, power, fertilizer, etc…Therefore, South Korea had 
appeared as independent & liberated nation with set of problems. 
As a result the whole economy was subject to foreign economic aid. 
 
Similarly, Korea was challenged by nation-wide problem after its 
independence. Despite its economic and human crises, the Korean 
War was the challenging problem after 2-years of independence, in 
1950. In fact, this war was the worst phenomenon in the Korean 
history.  
 
During the war unemployed mass including the displaced people 
were suffered with starvation and disease. Existing infrastructure 
and poor economy were destroyed during the war. In sum, the 
period 1948-53 was a great challenge for Korea as a nation and 
governments in that period.  
 
The above-mentioned problems were the main motives to the 
government to device sustainable solutions. It was expected to 
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focus on long-term solutions instead of short-term solutions, which 
were subject to massive relief aid.  
 
Therefore, the government gave great emphases on in-ward 
looking development strategy. The main focus was on substitution 
of consumer goods and some heavy industries like cement and 
fertilizer.  
 
The in-ward strategy was supported by protective measures. 
Quantitative import restrictions and high tariff are the measures, 
which almost completely sealed off domestic industries from foreign 
competition.  
 
In addition to the above restrictions, the official exchange rate was 
overvalued. In this period, import-substituting industries were 
significantly subsidized. They had been receiving tax and financial 
subsidies. Unlike to the import substitute industries, the export 
producing industries were not subsidized significantly.  
 
Despite its vision, government in the period 1953-61 failed to bring 
about stable and fast economic progress. Therefore, they divert 
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their attention to mitigate the trade deficit and the whole economic 
problems by only trying to raise high foreign economic aid and 
restrain import demand. Suk Tai-Suh summed up the situation in 
his article. 
  
…The period of 1953-61 during which the real GNP grew at 4.4 
percent annually on average was characterized by the following 
three factors: (1) heavy dependence on foreign economic aid, (2) 
heavy protection of domestic industries from foreign competition, 
and  (3) a consistently over-valued foreign exchange rate policy 
coupled with severe foreign exchange control.15 
 
4.2. Overview of Foreign Economic Aid before 1961 
 
Korea had received massive foreign economic aid for continuous 
period, starting from independence to 1961. In most cases the 
foreign economic aid donated to Korea was not in loan form but 
almost fully in grant form. Particularly, during the period 1945-53, 
the nation received a total grant of 1041.1 million U.S. dollars.  
 
                                                 
15 Suk Tai Suh, The effects of export incentives on Korea export growth, 1981, Korea Development Institute 
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Some scholars (e.g. Suk Tai Suh) argued that the annual in flow of 
foreign economic aid to Korea reached about $200 to 300 million 
U.S. dollars in the period prior to 1961.16 
 
This shows that the government top priority was financing its 
balance deficits through foreign aid as all developing countries are 
doing today. Table 3.1 shows the amount of economic assistance 
donated to Korea during 1945-1953. This table could be useful to 
compare the volume of foreign aid before independence and the 
years after independence. 
 
Table 3.1. Economic Assistance to 
Korea 1945-53 
 (Millions U.S. dollars) 
Year Total Amount 
1945 4.9 
1946 49.9 
1947 175.4 
1948 179.6 
1949 116.5 
1950 58.7 
1951 106.5 
1952 161 
1953 188.6 
Total 1041.1 
     Source: Korean Economy: Issues of Development, Cole, D., 1980 
 
                                                 
16 Suk Tai Suh, The effects of export incentives on Korea export growth, 1981, Korea Development Institute 
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As we can observe from the table, the average grant for Korea for 
these 9-years calculated around 120 million U.S. dollars annually. It 
was considerable amount of money by the time. It is observed 
clearly that the nation received higher amount of foreign aid after 
independence than the years before independence. 
 
Not differently, foreign economic aid to Korea had been pumped 
continuously up to 1961. The economic assistance provided to 
Korea during 1953 to 1961 was highly grant dominated. Figure 4.1 
explains the trend of foreign aid to Korea from independence to 
1961.  
 
As it is shown in the figure, foreign economic aid to Korea in this 
period observed to be very high in the Korean economic history. 
Donor countries and agencies, like U.S. and UNKRA pumped large 
amount of resource in the period. 
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Figure 4.1. Foreign Economic Aid to Korea 
(1948-61)
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Most of researchers in the issue appealed that South Korea had 
received the highest amount of foreign aid compared to another 
time. Among the researchers, Cole, D. considers the period 1953-
61 as of high aid decade. According to him the massive inflow of 
foreign assistance before and during the Korean War was essential 
to the survival of South Korea as an independent country.17  
 
In addition to the above evidence, the data in the book written by 
Cole, D proved the same fact regarding the volume of foreign 
economic aid in the period.  
                                                 
17 Cole, D., Korean Economy: Issues of Development, 1980 
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Figure 4.2  Aid Financed Imports Relative to
 Total Imports1953-1970 (U.S. dollars)
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Source: Korean Economy: Issues of Development, Cole, D., 1980 
 
If we see the proportion of grant and loan in total imports of Korea 
during 1953-1970, it is easy to predict the amount of grant donated 
to Korea. It doesn’t required deep analysis to conclude that imports 
before 1961 highly grant dominated compared to the total imports 
to Korea. Almost 80% of imports to Korea were in the form of grant 
up to 1961. Foreign aid institutions and countries started to give aid 
in the form of loan after 1961.  
 
To sum up the previous explanations and figures proved that South 
Korea had been receiving huge amount of foreign aid in the period 
before 1961. Even though, the period after 1961 is covered in the 
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next chapter, the volume of foreign aid to Korea after 1961 is much 
lower than the volume before 1961.  
 
As Cole, D mentions it; no one denies that foreign economic aid for 
Korea in the considered period is important. But this general 
conclusion could not give clear answer what was its role for building 
sustainable, stable and healthy economy in Korea. Why it could not 
resulted fast economic development like Korea recorded after 
1961?  
 
The scope of the present topic is not to give final argument 
regarding these questions. But the most important element here is 
aid volume in this period is much higher than any time. I 
recommend my readers to keep these questions for next 
discussions.  
 
In order to give full answer for these basic questions or puzzles, 
however, we need to overview the economic performance of South 
Korea before 1961. In order to see the economic performance, it is 
possible to employ some economic indicators. Among the economic 
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indicators, GNP, trade balance, saving and investment are covered 
in the following topic.    
 
 4.3. Economic Performance Prior to 1961 
Despite the massive foreign economic aid, the economic growth of 
Korea was stagnant in the period prior to 1961.  Even though, the 
economy of Korea performed better than Latin American Countries 
at that time, it showed very little change as compared to growth in 
1960s. Adelman noted the economic performance of Korea in the 
period prior to 1961 as follows. 
 
During the years immediately preceding the beginning of the First 
Five-Year Plan, Korea was marked not only by political chaos but 
also by economic stagnation. Perhaps the most striking condition 
was the low growth level of GNP- and the stagnation in per capita 
private consumption and government consumption, which 
accompanied it. Investment, more than two-thirds of which was 
financed by foreign savings, was quite low. There was an 
encouraging increase in exports in 1961, but a large and increasing 
import balance overwhelmed this.18 
                                                 
18 Adelman, I. Practical Approaches To Development Planning, 1969 
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Different economic indicators for the period proved that the 
economy was not healthy for the whole period. Among the main 
indicators like trade balance continued to be negative until 1962. 
GNP of the nation showed very little change as Adelman explained 
it already. National savings were negative for the whole period. 
Imports from abroad were fully financed by grant, which pumped 
by foreign aid agencies and countries like U.S.  
 
4.3.1. The Trade Balance  
It is not new explanation that the trade balance for South Korea 
was a large negative number almost for the whole period prior to 
1961. In addition to the couple problems faced the nation, the 
strategy the government followed was ineffective to bring about 
immediate solutions.  
 
Suk believed that some export incentive policies were adopted to 
promote export promotion although their effectiveness proved to be 
low. According to him the most important of these was the so-called 
export-import link system, which permitted the conversion of 
export earnings to foreign exchange certificates that were freely 
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bought and sold at a high premium in the foreign exchange 
market.19  
 
He also added that incentives like direct incentive that was paid at 
varying rates depending upon the type of export goods. These 
export incentive measures were not effective in inducing the labor-
intensive light manufacturing sectors to expand for export 
production since they did not compensate for the over-valued 
exchange rate that penalized exports.20  
 
Because of unsound policy measures and inefficient incentives in to 
the export sector, this sector continued to be stagnant and leads to 
negative trade balance for the long time. In addition to Suk Tai Suh 
explanation, the following diagram can give us full picture about the 
trade balance in 7-years.  
 
 
                                                 
19 Suk Tai Suh, The effects of export incentives on Korea export growth, 1981, Korea Development Institute 
20 Suk Tai Suh, The effects of export incentives on Korea export growth, 1981, Korea Development Institute 
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Figure 4.3 The  Trade balance
(in million U.S dollars)
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Source: Calculated from the data in Suk Tai Suh, 1981 
 
If we observe Fig.4.3 carefully, we can see to what extent the trade 
balance deficit continued throughout the whole period and how it 
was worst. Export had been failed to compensate the import 
volume sufficiently. The export sector was neglected or not given 
due attention through out the period as explained earlier. Import 
substitution industries were running on the expense of export 
sector because of the in-ward looking strategy.  
 
As far as the government’s development strategy was in-ward 
looking strategy, the main focus of the government continued to be 
the same with out looking other alternative policy measures. Its 
main solution was raising more foreign economic aid. The major 
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international institutions and countries like U.S.A. responded 
positively and they pumped massive aid.  
 
However, this massive foreign economic aid could not made 
considerable improvement in the economic performance of Korea. I 
believe this is a good indicator to evaluate the government and its 
economy, which had been highly depended on foreign aid. 
 
4.3.2. Gross Domestic Product 
 
To analyze the Korean economic performance prior to 1961, 
sophisticated techniques and large amount of data is not required. 
Many researchers and political analysts had discussed about this 
issue deeply and sufficiently. My objective here is to highlight the 
general economic indicators, which can help me to consolidate my 
point of discussion. Among the few economic indicators the Gross 
Domestic Product could be given priority. According to different 
studies, GNP of Korea grew insignificantly prior to 1961. Once again, 
I would like to take Adelman’s explanation. 
 
During the years immediately preceding the beginning of the First 
Five-Year Plan, Korea was marked not only by political chaos but 
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also by economic stagnation. Perhaps the most striking condition 
was the low growth level of GNP- and the stagnation in per capita 
private consumption and government consumption, which 
accompanied it. 21 
 
There are several factors that caused the stagnant economic growth 
of Korea in the considered period. Even though, Korea had several 
challenges one after another, its in-ward looking economic strategy 
considered as the main reason for this poor economic performance.  
Figure 4.4 Korea-Three-Year Moving Sums of 
National Acounts,1957-64
(Million 1966 U.S. dollar)
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Source: Korean Economy: Issues of Development, Cole, D., 1980 
Figure 4.4 explains GNP growth in the form of three-year moving 
sums. According to the figure, GNP continued with very little 
increment through out five years, 1957-1961. Therefore, GNP for 
                                                 
21 Adelman, I. Practical Approaches To Development Planning, 1969 
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Korea was not attractive for the whole period independent to 1961. 
In the same manner, the per capita GNP for the period is very low, 
which showed negligible increment from 71.4 in 1955 to 89.7 in 
1961.22  
 
4.3.3. National Savings and Gross Investment 
 
In the same case, the national savings showed large negative 
number for the whole period independence-1961. As I have pointed 
out earlier, the direction of the government was focusing on import 
substitution.  
 
In order to achieve its target it had invested large amount of capital 
that was over stated, when it was compared with that of national 
savings. Why the national savings become very low? We may put 
several reasons for this issue.  
 
If we mention some of the important reasons, our attention will fall 
on unsound policy measures. On the other hand, the over all impact 
of the policy measures in the economy like low per capita income 
and high level of unemployment are also important factors. 
                                                 
22 Figures are from Suk Tai Suh, effects of export incentives on Korean export growth. 
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Whatever is the reason, the national savings for the period is one of 
the indicators that could show us the unhealthiness of the economy. 
The gap among the savings and investment was quite large and 
unmanageable.    
     
Figure 4.5 Korea- National Savings and Gross
                   Investment 1957-64  ($millions U.S. dollar)
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Source: Korean Economy: Issues of Development, Cole, D., 1980 
 
As explained in Figure 4.5, saving is negative in the period 1957-
1960. Where as the gross investment for this period observed to be 
more than 800 million U.S. dollars annually for the same period. 
This implies that foreign savings covered this large investment. 
Based on Adelman explanation, more than two-thirds of the total 
investment was financed by foreign savings.23 
 
                                                 
23 Adelman, I. Practical Approaches To Development Planning, 1969 
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Based on the above brief explanations, we can put one simple 
argument, which is based on the Cole, D. explanation about the role 
of aid in Korean economic development. As it is discussed in the 
first part of this paper, Cole, D. argued that foreign aid had played 
a critical role for development of the Korean economy. But as we 
proved it already, the decade before 1961 was high foreign aid 
decade as he explained it. However, we also observed that the 
Korean economy showed insignificant improvement during this 
period. 
 
To sum up, the Korean economic performance prior to 1961 was 
characterized with slow GNP growth, chronic trade balance deficits, 
negative savings, aid dominated, and protectionist economy. 
 
Based on the above results, it is possible to give summarized 
argument regarding foreign economic aid and economic growth in 
the period prior to 1961. All results regarding the issue proved that 
the volume of foreign aid in the entire Korean economic history.  
 
In contrast, the economic growth for the period showed stagnant, 
when it is compared with the period after 1961, the period with 
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very little foreign aid volume compared to the previous period.(see 
next chapter)  
 
This trend gives us that foreign aid, which was the highest in 
volume, could not pushed up the Korean economy in the period. 
This is also good evidence for the insignificant positive relationship 
between foreign aid and economic growth in Korea in the 
considered period. 
  
My intention here is not to conclude that foreign aid is not totally 
important or harmful to Korea in the period. The general argument 
is, however, there is no strong positive relation between foreign aid 
volume and economic growth so far observed.  
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Chapter 5  
Foreign Economic Aid and Economic Growth   
(After 1961) 
 
5.1.  Economic Development Strategy 
A new government led by Park Jung-Hee, who came into power in 
1961 had initiated the First Five-year Economic Development Plan. 
As of any country, Korea had two alternatives of economic 
development strategies: inward-looking strategy based on import 
substitution and outward-looking development strategy based on 
exports. 
 
From the experience of other developing countries, the inward-
looking economic development strategy was not successful. 
Particularly, governments before Park Jung-Hee tried this approach 
and the result was as we have discussed above. Furthermore, 
Korea’s poor natural resource endowment and small domestic 
market were considered as the main reasons to adopt out-ward 
looking based on export development strategy. 
 
Similarly, Park’s government strongly recognized that domestic 
market of Korea is small to observe the labor productivity of the 
nation. As Kim Kihwan explained it, the essence of the outward-
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looking strategy adopted in the early 1960s was to promote labor-
intensive manufacturing exports in which Korea had comparative 
advantage.24  
 
The other external factor was the declining of grant or economic aid 
from U.S. government. Suk Tai Suh had explained the issue in his 
paper, the shift in the U.S. aid policy in 1961 from reliance on a 
grant-type economic aid to a loan type economic assistance exerted 
pressure on the Korean government to search for an alternative 
source of foreign exchanges.25  
 
Park’s administration had taken these considerations aggressively. 
Kim Kihwan again explains the strong point of the government: for 
a nation with a long inward-looking tradition, the adoption of the 
outward-looking strategy was indeed very remarkable, and it is 
truly to the credit of the political leadership at that time that such 
strategy adopted.26 Therefore, the economic growth strategy was 
founded on realistic evaluation of Koreas comparative advantage 
                                                 
24 Kim Kihwan, The Korean Economy: Past Performance, Current Reforms, and Future Prospects, KDI, (1984) 
25 Suk Tai Suh, The Effect of Incentives on Korean Economic Growth: 1953-79, KDI, (1981) 
26Kim Kihwan, The Korean Economy: Past Performance, Current Reforms, and Future Prospects, KDI, (1984) 
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and alternative economic development strategies with their merits 
and demerits.  
 
After the development of the strategy, the Park administration had 
continued to take different types of reforms that are relevant to the 
export sector. The following part explains the main policy reforms 
that played crucial role in the export sector growth.  
 
In order to implement the export-led economic development 
strategy, the government’s prior task was encouraging export by 
employing direct and indirect incentives. In addition to the 
incentives, close follow up by means of sound policies had been the 
routine task of Park’s government. In addition, President Park used 
his military discipline to shape the government structure and his 
officials as they allow him to achieve his objective. Article from 
Hun-Joo explains Park’s role as follows.  
 
As a powerful military commander with multiple organs of 
repressive state machinery at his service, Park, to a large degree, 
institutionalized his rule through brute force. In the aftermath of 
the coup, the military council moved decisively to put an end to the 
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leftist demonstration: it imposed martial law on the country, 
arrested over 6,000 gangsters and suspected communists, and 
purged and replaced more than 4,000 politicians and bureaucrats 
with a new generation of military officers loyal to Park.27 
 
In addition, the government allied with big enterprises (Chaebols) 
and gave them unexpected resource support as well as gave them 
his great effort to get good working environment locally and outside 
of the country. In turn, Chaebols became more confident on the 
government and the government on the Chaebols. They become 
two faces of the same coin.  Hun-Joo also has explanation on this 
issue.  
 
Notwithstanding his predisposition to support small business, Park 
realized that the big businessmen, whether or not they stood 
accused of illicit wealth accumulation, were a scarce resource and 
that without their “proven” entrepreneurial skill at work, the 
promotion of rapid economic growth would not be feasible. Thus the 
military-turned-political-power holders exempted all of the indicted 
businessmen from criminal prosecution, limited the asset 
                                                 
27  Hun-Joo, Park (David), The SWORD-WON NEXUS AND The Origins of Korea’s Diseased Development, ( P.9) 
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confiscation to their commercial bank shares, and had them build 
new factories and donate their shares to the state. After that, big 
business became the proxy in the lop-sided nexus, subject to 
subordination and for the regime; the government funneled its 
financial and administrative support in their favor, while limiting 
market competition.28 
 
On the other hand, financial institutions, line ministries and other 
offices evaluated on the basis of their contribution to export, which 
is the first target of the development strategy. Relationship 
between the government and Chaebols was highly subject to their 
export volume.  If they export more it is more likely to get 
preferential loan and other incentives to exist as big Chaebles. 
President Park followed-up each Chaebol’s export volume and its 
activity closely. Financial institutions were forced to give loans for 
export industries (chaebols) with out any pre-conditions beyond the 
export volume. In more detail, the incentives and the 
macroeconomic policy measures, which are directly related with 
export growth, are presented in next discussions.  
 
                                                 
28  Hun-Joo, Park (David), The SWORD-WON NEXUS AND The Origins of Korea’s Diseased Development, ( PP12-13) 
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Despite the real picture of the Korean economic miracle, many 
people argued that the economic success is merely from the charity 
or donation of outsiders. In order to see to what extent foreign aid 
played its role in the course of the Korean economic miracle, we 
have to assess the volume of foreign aid after 1961. 
 
5.2.  Overview of Foreign Economic Aid After 1961  
From previous discussions we have proved that the decade 1950s 
was high foreign economic aid decade in the Korean economic 
history. The nation had received higher amount of aid when 
compared to the time before and after the decade. Based on the 
empirical figures, foreign aid in the period after 1961 had been 
declined continuously.  
 
Not only in volume, the nature of the donation was changed from 
grant type to loan in the considered period. All countries and donor 
agencies started to change their donation in to the form of loan. 
According to empirical evidences regarding the issue, 1960s was 
the first time to receive aid in the form of loan in Korea. If we see 
the volume of grant and loan financed import presented in Figure 
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5.1, foreign economic aid to Korea had been observed to be smaller 
starting from the early 1960s.  
 
Figure 5.1. Volume of Grant and Loan Financed 
Imports (1961-1974) 
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Source: Calculated using data in Cole, D., Korean Economy: Issues of 
Development, (1980) 
 
Based on Figure 5.1 imported goods and services before 1961 to 
Korea had been financed fully through grant. Further more, we can 
observe that loan financed imports totally introduced after 1961.  
 
In the same trend, grant financed imports had been sharply decline 
when we approach to the year 1961. This implies that foreign aid 
had sharply declined during this period. In contrast, the import 
volume has been increased sharply and the nation was in the 
position to cover its much of imports from its own sources.  
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In other words, the gap between total imports and amount of 
imports financed through loan and/or grant became wider. This 
confirms that foreign aid to Korea after 1961 is much smaller than 
foreign aid in the period before that year. 
 
Accounts from Bank of Korea for the period also proved the same 
fact regarding foreign aid and its volume. As we have discussed 
already the period 1950s was high foreign aid decade in the Korean 
economic history. The nation had received significantly high amount 
of foreign aid. In 1957 alone the country had received 382,893 
million U.S. dollars. This amount of foreign assistance is the highest 
amount in the history of Korea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1984. 
 
Figure 5.2 Foreign Economic Aid Received
 (1948-83)
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Unlike to the 1950s, foreign aid volume after 1960s became smaller 
and totally negligible amount in the end of 1960s and after 1970s 
respectively.  Figure 5.2 depicted to explain the trend of foreign aid 
volume to Korea starting from 1948 to 1983. Careful observation on 
the figure is enough to see foreign aid to Korea declined after 1961 
and almost approach to zero in 1970s. 
 
Both empirical figures proved the same fact on the volume of 
foreign aid in the considered period. Thus, the volume of foreign aid 
to Korea after 1961 is much lower than the time before.   
 
 
In addition to the above figures, some arguments and the analysis 
of the rationale to adopt export led economic growth strategy in the 
1960s prove the same conclusion on the matter. Most of 
researchers in the area have agree one of the reasons to adopt the 
export oriented economic development was a sharp declining of 
foreign aid (grant) to Korea in the early 1960s.  
 
In sum, we can conclude this discussion with the following 
explanation in the book “Developing Country Debt and Economic 
Performance. According to the book all of Korean imports and gross 
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investment was financed by foreign aid during the 1950s. However, 
the importance of foreign aid declined precipitously during the 
1960s, becoming a negligible source of funding by the mid-1970s.29 
 
5.3   Measures Towards Implementing the Export Led 
           Economic  Development Strategy 
 
5.3.1. Major Macroeconomic Policies  
 
Park’s administration had taken very important macroeconomic 
measures to stimulate the economy and to create good 
environment for export in his first step. Among them may be 
mentioned the nominal interest rate. Based on the note from 
Kihwan, to mobilize domestic savings the government allowed 
commercial banks to raise interest rates on deposits from 12% to 
as high as 26.4%. For three years in a row after 1965, the year 
when interest rates were raised, savings deposits in Korean banks 
nearly doubled each year.30   
 
This was one of the mechanisms used to organize or mobilize the 
limited resources for investing on the export sector. Even though, 
the economic performance of Korea at the time was at very low 
                                                 
29 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins, Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, 1989 
30 Kim Kihwan, The Korean Economy: Past Performance, Current Reforms, and Future Prospects, KDI, (1984) 
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level, the domestic policy enabled the government to utilize the 
available resources in the country.     
 
In addition, the government used the same approach to attract 
foreign capital in the early 1960s. According to the article written by 
Kihwan, to encourage the inflow of foreign savings to make up for 
the insufficiency of domestic savings, in 1966 the government 
enacted a comprehensive Foreign Capital Promotion Act Whereby 
the government underwrote the risk borne by foreign investors. The 
other important macroeconomic measure taken by government was 
the exchange rate adjustment. As Kihwan putted it in his article, in 
1964, the multiple exchange rate system and the Korean won were 
devalued by nearly 100%, thus eliminating a bias against the 
export sector.31 
 
These macroeconomic policies were in favor of the export sector 
through increasing investment in the country. As discussed in 
previous chapter, domestic savings were shown very low for very 
long time. In Park administration, however, savings grew sharply. 
                                                 
31 Kim Kihwan, The Korean Economy: Past Performance, C urrent Reforms, and Future Prospects, KDI, (1984) 
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The government succeeded to mobilize the resource in the country. 
As the result the Korean economy stimulated with in short time.  
 
As it is mentioned earlier, the export sector was the engine of the 
Korean economy during the take-off. The government prior 
objective was developing the export sector as means of economic 
growth in the nation. Therefore, it is vital to see what measures had 
taken to encourage export in the early economic take-off. 
 
5.3.2. Incentives to Promote the Export Sector 
This topic explains the main export incentives, which are provided 
to export industries, export trade companies, and importers of raw 
material for export production. In order to ease my explanation, I 
divided these incentives in to direct and indirect incentives. 
 
Incentives included under direct incentives are the incentives 
related to tax, loan, tariff and financial reserve, which provided to 
export producers, trading companies and importers of raw materials 
for export production. On the other hand, indirect incentives are 
incentives that help exporters by giving them good environment in 
the production of export goods and trading.  
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a) Direct Incentives 
The following are some direct incentives, from the paper written by 
Suk Tai Suh. 
1. Full indirect tax exemption and 50 percent reduction in the 
business income tax 
2. a) Short-term preferential loans at interest rates below the 
commercial bank discount rate for exports, coupled with 
automatic loan approval, and 
    b) Medium and long-term preferential loans for capital  
        investment for export production. 
3. Full exemption of tariff on raw materials imported for export 
production 
4. An export-import link system largely abolished in the early 
seventies, by which exporters of certain specified items were 
granted an automatic approval of the importation of certain 
items not otherwise imported 
5. The wastage allowance system by which certain proportion of 
raw materials imported duty free for export production was 
allowed for domestic use 
6. Generous depreciation allowances for capital equipments used 
in export production  
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7. Special provisions for reducing the taxable income earned on 
export production by a certain proportion (usually 1 percent) 
of total export sales 
8. Special provisions for the large trading companies that 
exported more than the annually adjusted export target and 
met the commodity and market diversification requirement 
since 1976, which includes  
• establishing a larger reserve fund for possible loss in 
exporting to foreign markets for the purpose of 
reducing income tax  
• increasing foreign exchange holdings in excess of the 
limits set by the existing foreign exchange regulations. 
 
These direct incentives were implemented in close follow-up of 
high-ranking government officials including President Park. Financial 
institutions were highly controlled by government in order to get 
power to direct the financial resource towards the first objective. 
Government officials were very active to implement these incentive 
programs in proper way. In addition, Park’s government structure 
and institutional settings were adjusted to wards this program. 
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b) Indirect (Administrative) Export Promotional measures 
These incentives were very crucial in the promotion of export. 
Growth of the export sector could not achieved only through direct 
incentives. Favorable environment like; efficient bureaucracy, good 
coordination among government offices, managerial talent, 
technical Know-how are needed. The very strong point of the Park 
administration was achieving these preconditions that help for fast 
growth of export.  
 
Pre-conditions like; effective bureaucracy and coordination was the 
core competence of Koreans at that time. This also helped Korea to 
take the advantage. These administrative incentives may include 
the following: 
 
1. The actions taken by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
Ministry of Economic Planning Board, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the support of exports 
2. The activities of the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation 
(KOTRA), a semi-private corporation, to collect oversea 
market information, to help with the overseas exhibitions, 
and to otherwise assist in foreign market. 
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3. The activities of the private Korea Trade Association, to 
provide policy recommendations, to assist with research for 
export promotion, and to act as a channel between the 
private business sector and the government in general. 
4. A monthly export promotion meeting was held every month, 
at which the current state of export activity and the related 
problems were reported to the president. This monthly 
meeting was a manifestation of the priority afforded to export 
promotion in the nation’s economic policies. 
 
5.3. Rapid Economic Growth After 1961 (take-off period)    
Before 1960s, Korea was marked with poor economic performance 
and it was among the poor countries in the world. In the year 1961, 
however, a new economic development strategy emerged and the 
country starts to experience the golden era in its economic 
revolution. The following some indicators can explain the fast 
improvement in the Korean economic performance after 1961.  
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5.3.1. The Trade Balance 
Based on the economic development strategy, which gives strong 
emphasis to export, with the support of especial macroeconomic 
policies and incentives, Park administration laid a cornerstone for 
the Korean economic development with in a short time. It able to 
mobilize, coordinate and channel the resources to its prior objective, 
which is export-led economic growth. The people of Korea and its 
government did miracle with in less than one generation. President 
Park Chung Hee had explained the efforts and the success in few 
years in his speech on January 16, 1965 speech. 
 
From many years, Korea exported only $ 20 million to $30 million 
worth of goods a year. Even such exports were negligible, except 
for tungsten. But in these past few years, the government and 
people awoke from a sleep and strove. Exports began to expand 
rapidly. Last year, our exports exceeded the $120million mark. 
Although there is still a gap in the balance of payments, this much 
is true: that we have acquired the self-confidence that we, too, can 
favorably compete with others in the international export race. … 
The international community is gradually awakening to the export 
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potentials of Korea. I believe that the time has come finally for us 
to reap the fruit of our investment.32  
 
In the decade remarkable improvement had been recorded in the 
export regime. Export volume increased sharply from less than 100 
million U.S. dollars in the early 1960s to as much as 3257 million 
U.S. dollars in the early 1970s. Even though, the export sector was 
in poor performance for the whole period prior to 1961, it was 
learned that Korea exported 32 times as higher as than 1962 in the 
consecutive decade. 
 
Figure 5.3 The Trade Balance
(1965-85)
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Source: Bank of Korea various sources 
 
                                                 
32 Park Chung Hee, Major Speeches By Korea’s Park Chung Hee, Hollym Corporation Publishers, 1970 (PP.297-313) 
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As shown in the above figure, the trade balances for the period 
after 1961 were observed to be much better than the years before. 
Even though the trade balance is negative in the period, it is clear 
the performance is much better than the situation explained in 
chapter 4 Figure 4.3.    
 
5.3.2.  Per Capita GNP 
The rapid export growth was accompanied with fast improvement in 
the economic performance of the country. All economic and social 
development indicators proved that Korea had emerged as strong 
economy with in a decade.  As Cole, David noted out; the dominant 
feature of the Korean economy since the early 1960s, the feature 
that has been most influential in shaping the structure and 
character of the country’s everyday economic life, has been the 
extraordinary rapid rate of economic development. Real gross 
national product almost quadrupled from 1963 to 1977, making the 
average annual growth rate of 10% one of the world’s highest. 
Population rose from 27 million to between 36 and 37 million during 
this period, an increase of 35%, while the average Korean’s annual 
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consumption more than doubled, reaching the $450-$500 level by 
1977.33  
    
Figure 5.4 Growth of Per Capita GNP (1965-85)
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Source: Bank of Korea various sources 
Among the economic growth indicators, growth of per capita GNP 
could be given attention. As noted by several researchers per capita 
GNP had been increased sharply with in short time after 1961.  
 
The above figure depicts per capita GNP growth for 20 years, 1965-
85. In 1961 per capita income in Korea was not exceed 90 U.S. 
dollars. After three years, however, per capita GNP grew more than 
triple. Similarly, it showed more than 10 folds after 10 years.  
 
 
                                                 
33 Cole, D., Korean Economy: Issues of Development, (1980) 
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Chapter 6  
The Role of Foreign Economic Aid in the Rapid 
Economic Growth 
 
6.1. Foreign Aid Played Insignificant Role During the  
        Take-Off 
 
In previous chapters, we proved that the volume of foreign aid to 
Korea in the period before 1961 was very high and declined 
consequently. Additional works in the area showed that flows of 
foreign aid rose to a high of 16 percent of GNP in 1957, averaged 
8-9 percent during 1959-62, 2 percent during 1966-68, 1 percent 
during 1969-71, and have been negligible since 1972.34 
 
Despite the negative trend on the flow of foreign aid to Korea, the 
history of economic growth for the nation showed extremely fast 
speed on its improvement. The improvements in the basic economic 
and social development indicators were much higher than one can 
imagine. 
  
Therefore, all evidences on the issue showed that there is no strong 
correlation between foreign aid and economic growth in the 
                                                 
34 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins, Development Country Debt and Economic Performance, 1989 
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economic history of Korea. To strengthen the discussion point, we 
can take the following some empirical evidences, which based on 
the basic economic indicator ‘GNP’ and flow of ‘Foreign Aid’. 
 
Figure 5.5 GDP Vs Foreign Aid
(1965-83)
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Source: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1984. 
 
As shown in the above figure and already discussed in previous 
discussions, the trend on flows of foreign aid to Korea declined 
continuously and became almost negligible in the 1970s.  
 
In contrast, Gross Domestic Product increased steadily starting 
from the early 1960s and reached the highest level during the 
period at which foreign aid volume became a negligible source in 
the Korean economy. 
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These all evidences are cornerstones for my conclusion on the role 
of foreign aid on the rapid economic growth. Based on the empirical 
facts on foreign aid and economic growth, we can conclude that the 
impact of foreign aid on the economic growth in Korea was almost 
negligible.  
 
The miraculous economic growth in Korea was registered in the 
period at which foreign aid became to the very small contributor in 
to the economy and very small source of funding.   
 
However, there are plenty of evidences that can prove all possible 
grants from outside utilized wisely in the period. The government in 
the period and its policy could be considered as very good 
environment for the coordination of foreign capital inflow. The 
following is President Park’s speech about production, export and 
construction on January 16,1965. 
 
Loans to be granted by the United States, Federal Republic of 
Germany and other European nations, and Japan will amount to a 
considerable sum this year. What is needed is reorganization of our 
aid-receiving posture. To receive foreign capital promptly and use it 
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correctly, I plan to reform and strengthen parts of the economic 
administration setup for more efficiency. As I have mentioned 
already, medium and small industries will receive special attention. 
First, the government will support conversion to export industries.35 
 
Thus, Park government had been devoted to exploit the domestic 
resource and to an impressive level efficient to utilize wisely all 
foreign capital inflows. Even though, the volume of foreign aid was 
very small compared to the early period, the following strong points 
enables to record the economic miracle with in short time. 
 
The right choice of economic strategy was the main factor for 
success. The strategy strongly advocated on development of the 
export sector as its prior objective. The main secrete of the strategy 
goes to allocating the available resources to this objective. Not only 
the resources all policies and rules deliberately referred to the 
export sector. All projects proposed for loan approval screened on 
the basses of their contribution to export promotion.   
 
                                                 
35 Park Chung Hee, Major Speeches By Korea’s Park Chung Hee, Hollym Corporation Publishers, 1970 (PP.297-313) 
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The favorable policy environment in the country with combination 
to disciplined work force and relatively skilled manpower in the 
early time enabled to Korea to record rapid economic growth.     
    
6.2. Market favor as Other Side of Foreign Aid   
Based on different literatures regarding the role of U.S. markets, it 
was critical for the Korean economic development. Particularly, Cole, 
D. explained that US markets were the main host for the Korean 
exports. 
 
Basically the US market was one of the main markets for Korea’s 
commodities. As Chong-Hyun Nam explained it, ever since Korea 
began its outward-oriented economic development in the mid-
1960s, access to the U.S. market has been critical to Korea’s export 
success. Since 1965, except for a single year 1973, the US has 
provided the largest market for Korea’s exports.36  
 
Ironically, the US market to Korean exports was very important in 
the initial export growth. But what is the share when it is compared 
with other markets? The following figure shows an average export 
                                                 
36 Chong-Hyun Nam, US Trade Policy and Its Effects on Korean Exports, 1990 (P.5)  
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volume of the Korean merchandize to five selected countries during 
1967-1976. 
 
Figure 6.1 Share of Korea's Exports by Major 
Trading Countries(10-years Average, 1967-1976) 
U.S
35%
Canada
4%Japan
27%
Others
25%
Hong Kong
4%
Germany
5%
 
Source: Suk Tai Suh, The effects of export incentives on Korea 
export growth, 1981,  
 
During the period, 1967-76, the annual Korean export to US market 
amounted 35 percent in average. However, the Japan share is not 
small which amounted 27 percent in average. Though American 
market had higher share, the difference is not that much 
exaggerated with respect to the Japan share.  
 
On the other hand, we can understand that Korea had several trade 
partners from the beginning and its export was not especial favor 
from US but based in quality and competition.  
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Regarding this issue Paul Krugman have putted his conclusion from 
empirical studies. Based on his conclusion Korean exports tend to 
be systematically of higher quality than Taiwanese exports, at least 
when quality is proxied by unit value.37        
 
Therefore, one of the issues to be considered here is the 
competence of Korea’s exports in the world market. In the same 
way, Chong-Hyun Nam explained that while bilateral trade between 
the two countries grew tremendously in size, the bilateral trade 
balance was persistently in favor of the US until 1981. It shifted 
into Korea’s favor beginning in 1982 and has since grown to a 
significant magnitude, reaching a peak at $ 9.7 billion in 1987.38 
 
Ironically, integration to the world market is more important for 
economic growth of nations. Trade partners to Korea in its early 
development played crucial role in the process of economic 
development.  
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Paul Krugman & Alasdair Simth, Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy,  
       University of Chicago Press, 1994 
38 Chong-Hyun Nam, US Trade Policy and Its Effects on Korean Exports, 1990 (P.10) 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion and Recommendation 
7.1. Conclusion 
 
 
In previous discussions, this material tried to give a brief 
explanation on puzzles like, 1) what is the role of foreign economic 
aid in Korea’s early development (take-off)? 2) Why the Korean 
Economy grew fast after the early 1960s? Had Korea got more 
foreign aid after 1961 than before?  In addition the paper gives 
brief explanation on the export volume of Korea to American 
market with respect to the Korean miracle.   
 
The findings showed that foreign aid to Korea before 1961 was 
much higher in the history of the nation. The nation received huge 
sum of resources from outside. The governments in the period 
exerted their maximum efforts to raise foreign aid. All countries like 
U.S.A and international organizations showed their strong interest 
to pump their aid to the nation in the period.  
 
However, the economy had been observed to be stagnant through 
out the whole period before 1961. The basic economic indicators 
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like national savings, GNP, trade balance and others observed to be 
worst. Thus, the huge amount of foreign aid in the period could not 
made any significant change on the economy.  
 
Despite, very limited amount of foreign aid in the period after 1961, 
the Korean economy recorded significant change with in very short 
time. The basic economic indicators showed impressive 
improvement with in less than three years. Therefore, we can seize 
that foreign aid impact on economic development was negligible in 
the economic miracle in South Korea.  
 
On the other hand, the US market played important but not critical 
role for the export growth vis-à-vis economic growth of Korea. 
From the previous discussions, we proved that Korea had been 
made trade relationship with many other countries in the world. 
Particularly, Japan was other largest host for Korean exports. The 
average difference for 10 years when compared with exports to US 
was not more than 6-7 percent of the total exports of Korea. 
 
In addition, other evidences proved that Korean exports had been 
based on quality than on especial favor from US. Similarly, US had 
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highly benefited from the mutual trade than Korea in the early 
period. Then we can conclude that Korea’s exports to US based on 
quality and on the principle of market. As far as U.S.A. benefited 
more from the mutual trade, we cannot say U.S.A. has gave market 
favor to Korea. Evidences on the competence of Korean exports in 
the world market are strong than of the other way. 
 
My final conclusion is then the Korean success falls on the internal 
strength and quality than external factors. Though foreign aid has 
its own impact, internal factors, like effective development strategy 
after 1961, sound policies, committed workforce and leadership and 
other internal qualities should be given more weight. 
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7.2. Recommendations  
The secret of the Korean miracle goes to the right choice of 
development strategy. The outward looking development strategy 
adopted was highly based on careful study of Koreas comparative 
advantage. The elite in the period evaluated the strong and weak 
sides of the nation. 
 
Based on realistic evaluation, administration in the time identified 
the prime target of the strategy (export sector) and designed 
comprehensive development plan. This system helped the 
government to allocate the scarce resources to the prime target, 
which is promoting export.  
 
The other important lesson is the human resource development that 
played a vital role in achieving the prime objective. In the early 
take-off, Korea had relatively educated manpower. The government 
also took very important steps to mobilize intellectuals in inside and 
overseas. The sole example for this is the establishment of KDI and 
KIAST in the early 1970s. These institutions were established to 
encourage and to utilize the Korean intellectuals in the economic 
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development process. Similarly, the government bureaucracy was 
designed in the bases of the first objective of the nation. 
 
The current leaders in developing countries should seize the above 
qualities during their economic planning. Instead of searching open 
market and massive economic assistance from outsiders, they 
should focus on their internal quality to utilize what they have and 
work on the preconditions to take any advantage from outside.  
 
They should have to show commitment to design effective 
development strategy, to build committed bureaucracy and work 
force that can implement their program. It is true that the 
environment is changed and there is no easy environment like the 
Korean take-off period. Now days, international regulations like 
WTO regulations are other difficulties to these poor countries. But 
the sentiments I have discussed above may aggravate the problem 
more.  
 
Thus, poor countries should focus on their internal quality first as 
Koreans did in their first efforts for success. Then they have to 
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identify the priority target and design policies depending on their 
internal qualities.  
 
There is no doubt the Korean experience will not a blue print and 
applicable as it is. How ever, its clear explanation my help the poor 
countries to see their internal qualities instead of searching easy 
market opportunities and foreign aid. These couldn’t be the final 
solutions for their poverty and source of success.  
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